In this paper, we analyze political debates about headscarves and honor-related crimes in France and the Netherlands. We seek to explain why and how France and the Netherlands have come to unevenly politicize headscarves and honor crimes. Moreover, we try to understand how the argument of gender equality is used by different actors in these policy debates. We argue that the agenda and demands of ethnic minority women 0 s organizations are selectively included and bent to serve other, non-feminist agendas. Ethnic minority women 0 s organizations and female ethnic minority politicians have acted as agenda-setters, calling attention to marginalization, discrimination, and experiences of violence. Yet these issues were co-opted by (mainly) right-wing politicians to problematize the "deviant" culture of minorities and propose policies that further exclude them and paternalize them instead of improving their situation.
Introduction
Headscarves, female genital mutilation, honor crimes, and forced marriages have recently become major issues on the political agenda in many European countries. These debates and policies all function according to the logics of cultural otherness and position women's bodies as central to a controversy over clashing cultures, involving modern, liberal society versus traditional, non-western illiberal cultures (Phillips 2009, 25) . The question emerges of when and how strongly these issues become politicized in different contexts. In this paper, we compare two of these emblematic policy issues (female Islamic head and body covering and "honor-related" crimes) in two countries that have different institutional legacies in dealing with ethnic, gender, and religious differences (the Netherlands and France). We address four main puzzles. First, we seek to explain why and how France and the Netherlands have come to unevenly politicize headscarves and honor crimes. Second, we try to understand how the argument of gender equality is increasingly used by different actors in these policy debates and the gendered implications thereof. Third, we examine the (limited) influence of women's organizations and feminist actors on the framing and policy outcomes. Fourth, we look at the interplay between institutional settings, actors and framing and discuss the (potential) consequences of these processes in both countries.
Our analysis demonstrates that while head and body covering of Muslim women is a highly contentious political issue in France, the level of politicization of this issue in the Netherlands has occurred much lower and later. The issue of honor-related violence became a major issue on the Dutch political agenda in 2006, but received only scant attention in the French political debate. We show these differences are path-dependent effects of historical institutions and traditions. Yet, there is also some remarkable convergence between France and the Netherlands. Over time, both issues received increasing attention in the two countries and more importantly, in the parliamentary debates on both topics, gender equality has become a central argument, with gender equality being represented as a core value of national culture (Ticktin 2008) . Much of this gender-equality discourse has come from politicians who, by linking arguments on gender equality to issues like public order, security and national identity, police the boundaries of the imagined national community. Ferguson and Marso (2007) label this connection between gender equality and security strategy as a "new politics of gender" that supports particular interpretations of "women's rights", but is far from feminist 1 in that it is grounded in a conservative gender ideology, which characterizes women as submissive, vulnerable, and therefore in need of rescue (Abu-Lughod 2002; Ahmed 1992) .
The gendered effects of this discourse are paradoxical, because as a result (some) gender issues have been taken up, sometimes after years of struggle and non-response (Coene and Longman 2008; Dustin and Phillips 2008) . Also, it has contributed to an increasing visibility of minority women and some recognition of their interests on the political agenda. Yet, our analysis makes clear that in the political debates on head and body covering and honor-related violence, the voices and frames of minority women's organizations are strategically and/or selectively used by politicians, in particular rightwing and populist politicians, without adopting the larger agenda of these groups. While gender equality is promoted, other feminist demands to address problems of socio-economic marginalization and discrimination against minority women or to strengthen their legal position are not adopted. This indicates that political actors co-opt rather than act upon feminist frames. 2 The article is divided into four parts, addressing our four main puzzles. First, we show why a comparison of debates in France and the Netherlands is useful. Second, we explain our data and methodology. Third, we compare political debates on head and body covering of Muslim women and honorrelated violence in France and the Netherlands. We will explain the differences and similarities in salience and framing of these two issues, in particular paying attention to the use of gendered frames in policy debates. In the conclusion, we look at the interplay between institutional settings, actors and framing and discuss the (potential) consequences of the new politics of gendering in both countries.
Comparing France and the Netherlands: Beyond Institutions, The Nation, and Gender
Various sociologists have focused on the question why European nationstates have responded differently to the increasing cultural and religious pluralism resulting from immigration. In this "institutionalist" literature, different policies of citizenship and immigrant integration, which are often related to historical paths of state-formation and nation building, are seen as determining policy responses regarding immigrants (Brubaker 1992; Favell 1998; Joppke 1998; Koopmans et al. 2005) . France and the Netherlands are often presented as ideal-typical examples of two different citizenship and integration "models" and therefore make an interesting comparison. France is considered as the proto-typical example of a Republican model in which immigrants can easily become French citizens, yet are asked, in order to secure common citizenship, to assimilate and to exist in the public sphere as citizens only. Republican universalism has been analyzed as a recurrent discursive obstacle to women's demands for inclusion. The Netherlands, in contrast, is often labelled as a multicultural model, which combines easy access to citizenship with tolerance of cultural and religious diversity in public life (Koopmans et al. 2005) . The basic assumption of institutional approaches is that these models present a set of immutable norms, informing legitimate political discourses and practices. Public policies thus develop according to a "logic of path-dependence" or "logic of appropriateness", defined as socially constituted and culturally framed rules and norms embedded in political institutions (Schmidt 2010) . Following this logic, we would expect the issues at stake to be treated very differently in France and the Netherlands.
Yet, institutional approaches have a number of limitations. First, institutional models are better at explaining continuity than political and policy change. Second, an emphasis on path-dependency and historical policy legacies cannot well account for similarities between countries in the saliency of these issues or in the gendering of policy debates. Third, the emphasis on structural elements overlooks the role of agency and framing. Institutional approaches have difficulty in properly conceptualizing and accounting for political conflict and contestation. The contestation of dominant models and policy logics of actors within and outside state institutions may result in In Defence of Gender Equality? institutional change when a dominant perception or model is successfully substituted by an alternative frame.
We therefore propose a more dynamic explanation that also pays attention to the actors involved in the policy-making processes on the veil 3 and honorrelated violence and the competing meanings they give to these issues and their institutional surroundings. We use the notion of hegemonic state projects of Kantola and Dahl (2005) to describe institutional patterns that developed the framing contest in important, historically and contextually specific ways. "However", as Kantola and Dahl rightly argue, "the hegemonic projects are created in potential spaces of struggle and resistance, where an on-going war of positions takes place" (2005, 62) . In order to understand the outcome of these framing struggles, we therefore consider the impact of not only (internally heterogeneous and contested) institutional policy legacies, but also power constellations, discourse coalitions-in particular between women's groups and politicians-and crucial events. We particularly pay attention to the extent to which women's organizations managed to gender the parliamentary debates in ways that are empowering or disempowering for women.
Methodology and Data
We use a critical frame analysis approach (Verloo 2005) to reconstruct the framing of veiling and honor-based violence in policy making. According to this approach, two key dimensions of a policy frame are the diagnosis (what is constituted as the problem by the political actor, what is seen as the cause of the problem and what as the effect) and the prognosis (what solution to that problem is proposed). Policy actors do not always articulate a fully elaborated policy frame and may use certain elements of one diagnostic frame without supporting its direction or, conversely, they may reach the same conclusion on the prognosis but from different problem representations. In the paper, we will describe which actors used which frames in the debates on headscarves and honor-related crimes.
Our data consist of political debates about female Islamic head and body covering from 1989 until 2007. Although the headscarf in France was a political issue long before 1989, it only became a domestic question in the late 1980s with the struggles of postcolonial migrants claiming full citizenship, the emergence of far right-wing parties and international rise of Political Islam (Scott 2007) . The debates about honor-related crimes stretch over a much shorter period, since this issue did not enter the political agenda until the year 2000 in the Netherlands and 2002 in France. Our source materials are primarily parliamentary debates since we are interested in explaining differences in the politicization and regulation of the issues. The political documents were found in the parliamentary databases or archives of each country by means of keywords and thematic searches. The attention for the two issues in each country was measured by counting the number of parliamentary debates devoted to the issue, together with written and oral questions, motions, and law proposals. In order to present a balanced portrayal of the way feminist arguments were articulated in the discussions, we analyzed positions taken by feminist actors and (migrant) women's organizations in reaction to the political and media debate. To this end, we used LexisNexis searches to find the keywords feminist, feminism, headscarf, burqa, honor-related violence, honor-revenge in mainstream French and Dutch media in the period 1989-2009.
Debates on Female Islamic Head and Body Covering
All over Europe, heated debates have emerged about Islamic head and body covering in the public sphere, particularly in institutions like the judiciary, the police, the state administration and public schools. In both the French and Dutch political arena, the veil has been an issue of contestation but, as figure 1 makes clear, the French parliamentary debate was more intense and started almost a decade earlier compared with the Netherlands. Yet, in both countries attention to this issue increased after the turn of the millennium.
If we look at the actors that politicized the issue in the two countries (figures 2 and 3), we see continuity in France and a shift in the Netherlands. Whereas in France right-wing parties dominated the debate throughout the whole period we studied, in the Netherlands it was mostly left-wing parties that placed the issue on the political agenda in the 1980s and 1990s, and after 2003 populist right-wing parties took over. This shift can be directly related to important changes in the Dutch political landscape following the September 11 events. Right-wing politician Pim Fortuyn, with his anti-Islam discourse, gained popularity. Fortuyn was murdered in May 2002, a few days before the national elections, but his party won a landslide victory on May 15 (twentysix seats in Parliament, corresponding to 17 percent of the electorate) (Doomernik 2005; Van der Veer 2006) . While the Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) soon lost its strong position due to internal disagreements, the influence of Fortuyn's anti-immigration rhetoric lasted and the LPF was succeeded by new populist anti-immigration parties.
Next we examine the content of the headscarf debates in both countries, to see how each issue has been framed over time. 
France
As figure 1 shows, the headscarf was a contentious issue in France from 1989 onwards, with a sharp rise in political attention in 2003. The issue of the headscarf entered the political debate in 1989 when three Muslim schoolgirls who refused to remove their headscarves were expelled from a public school. The case attracted a lot of attention in the media and political realm. The Socialist Minister of Education Lionel Jospin referred the case to the highest administrative court, the State Council ("Conseil d'Etat"). It ruled that the wearing of signs of religious affiliation by students in public schools was not necessarily incompatible with the principle of laïcité, as long as these signs were not ostentatious, or acts of proselytism. 4 The decision underscored students' rights to freedom of religion and religious expression. Based on the council's ruling, Jospin left it to local school authorities to decide, on a caseby-case basis, whether headscarves (and other signs of religious conviction) were admissible or not (JO no., 25 October, 1989, 4113-4115) .
This decision received criticism within his own party and a group of parti socialiste members pleaded in favor of a general ban on the headscarf, yet others opposed such a drastic measure for being counterproductive. Also, right-and left-wing opposition parties criticized the accommodative stance of Jospin. Deputies of the right-wing Rassemblant pour la Republique (RPR) in particular framed the headscarf as an act of provocation that attacked French Republican citizenship, a visual sign of collective or individual segregation (a "repli communautaire") that rejected "French" values and principles of liberal individualism and secularism (JO no. 15577, October 25, 1989) . Equating the headscarf with the chador (a veil covering the full body) and making references to Islamic theocracies like Iran, deputies of the RPR framed the headscarf as an Islamist threat to the secular and democratic foundations of the state. Both left-and right-wing parties agreed that the headscarf conflicted with the principles of gender equality and argued that Republican schools functioned as a motor for girls' emancipation by providing them with the tools to break with their patriarchal community and to integrate in "French" society. The issue remained contentious and resurfaced on the political agenda throughout the 1990s.
Women's organizations were similarly divided about the issue from the outset of the debate. Traditional leftist feminist organizations affiliated to the National Council for Women's Rights (CNDF) expressed their concerns about the sexist nature of the headscarf, but advocated the inclusion of girls in schools to enable them to increase their autonomy. A few other organizations, including the abortion-rights Choisir, the Women's Rights League (LdF) and the French Movement for Family Planning (MFPF), already came out in favor of a ban (Rochefort 2002, 153) .
In 2003 of their veil off for official identity photographs. This announcement was followed by a series of legal proposals to call for a headscarf ban in public schools and fierce political debate. This time, a gender frame that represented the headscarf as a symbol of oppression became much more prevalent, together with arguments about security and public order. In June 2003, Parliament created a commission to study the issue (Debré Commission), and President Chirac appointed a commission to study the application of the laïcité principle (Stasi Commission). Both Commissions argued in favor of a ban, despite the different content of their proposals. The Stasi Commission concluded that "a great silent majority of young girls of immigrant origin need protection against Islamist groups forcing them to cover", 5 which had been a central argument of a highly visible new feminist group called Ni Putes Ni Soumises (NPNS). This organization started to mobilize in 2003 to denounce violence against girls in the migrant-populated poorer suburbs of Paris (the "banlieues"). Fadela Amara, chair of NPNS who later became Secretary of State for Urban Policies under the second UMP government, eventually came out in favor of a ban, suggesting that the headscarf promotes violence, sexism and patriarchy. In line with this, the Stasi Report stressed violence as an important argument in favor of a ban. In February 2004, Prime Minister Raffarin (UMP) introduced a legislative project to ban ostensible religious symbols in public schools, stating that this marked "a fundamental stage in the political project of 'living together' that serves national cohesion". 6 The proposed ban implied a clear departure from the existing accommodative case-by-case approach to the headscarves issue. Laïcité was presented as a central element of the French national identity, together with gender equality. President Chirac stated that "our combat for Republican values must go hand in hand with the struggle for women's rights and their equality to men . . .. The degree of a society's civilization is measured, in the first place, by the status of women in that society". 7 On February 10, 2004, a large majority in Parliament voted in favor of a ban. Opposition was voiced by some members of the Communist party who argued it would fuel fundamentalism and communalism.
Feminist supporters of a ban, 8 despite their heterogeneity, voiced the same type of discourse as the political arena, interpreting the headscarf as a symbol of women's oppression. They argued that the state should protect young girls from Islamists and from the men of their community, viewing the secular Republican state as the only assurance for women's rights (Ezekiel 2006) . Other feminist groups opposed a ban and argued that it might isolate girls in their stigmatized immigrant communities and render invisible socioeconomic inequalities that intersect with gender inequality. While the Stasi Commission invited both feminists in favor and opposed to a ban, the arguments about discrimination were set aside rather than integrated into analyses of the headscarf (Bassel and Emejulu 2010, 527) .
In June 2008, the debate shifted to the Islamic face-veil, after the State Council declared that a Moroccan-born woman had legitimately been refused French citizenship due to her wearing a niqab. The argument was that she adhered to "a radical religious practice that conflicted with the values of the Republic", notably the equality of the sexes (JO 286798, June 27, 2008) . One year later, President Nicolas Sarkozy established a parliamentary inquiry commission to study the possibilities of a law banning the public use of burqas. 9 The Commission, in its 2010 report, proposed a ban on all face covers in certain public institutions and in public transportation, but considered a full ban unlawful. The State Council also opposed a general ban. Against these advices, the government launched a legislative project to prohibit all types of face covering in public spaces (including the street), which was adopted by a majority of Parliament in July 2010. The project framed face covers in terms of public order and "French" values.
The Netherlands
As figure 1 indicates, in the Netherlands the veil only became salient after 2003, with the rise of populist right-wing parties that politicized the headscarf and face-veil. In contrast to France, the headscarf was almost a nonpoliticized issue during the 1980s and 1990s. There were some minor political debates, all initiated by left-wing parties, in which headscarves were framed in terms of (gender) discrimination as well as religious freedom. There was a strong social and political consensus in which the headscarf was framed as a religious right that was beyond the scope of state intervention.
Female MPs of the Green party (Groen Links) argued that any restrictions on wearing a headscarf on the work floor were discriminatory, and urged the government to enable Muslim women's own emancipation strategies and remove all obstacles that hindered their participation. 10 In 1999, the Dutch Equal Treatment Commission (ETC) confirmed that prohibitions on religious dress for public school teachers constituted a form of discrimination on grounds of religion (ETC 1999-18) . Muslim and migrant women's organizations did not mobilize on the headscarf issue and it was almost absent in feminist debates, except for some anti-headscarf columns in Dutch feminist magazine Opzij.
11
Yet, after the turn of the millennium, veiling became a more controversial issue in the political debate when it focused on the right of court personnel and police officers to express their religious affiliations, and when the face-veil became the center of attention. Central actors in the politicization were newly emerging anti-immigrant parties, LPF and PVV, who successfully linked the issue to the growing Islamophobia after 9/11. In 2004, the LPF requested a parliamentary debate on religious symbolism in the public service. In its framing, it drew clear boundaries between "our" Dutch, modern values such as gender equality and sexual tolerance and "their" Muslim culture or Islamic ideology, to argue for a headscarf ban in representative public functions (e.g. TK 59, March 17, 2004, 3880) . This framing was not supported by MPs of other parties, who viewed veiling as a right to religious freedom that also In Defence of Gender Equality? extended to public functionaries. Yet, a majority in Parliament argued that state officials working in "authoritative" public functions-like the police force, prison guards or people working in the judiciary-should refrain from displaying their religion. This position became Dutch policy.
In 2005, the political debate shifted to face covers, mainly referred to as the burqa.
12 Right-wing MP Geert Wilders, who had left the Liberal Party (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie [VVD] ) to have an independent seat in Parliament, raised the issue during a debate about terrorism in 2005. Two frames dominated these debates: a frame that emphasized security and public order and a second frame about gender equality. Wilders introduced a resolution requesting the government to take steps to prohibit the public use of the burqa in the Netherlands, arguing that "as a symbol of women's submission it is undesirable and it is unacceptable that people cannot be identified" (TK 29754, no. 53, October 13, 2005) . All right-wing parties, including the Christian Democrat party (Christen Democratisch Appel) and Liberal Party (VVD), supported the resolution. Both conservative Liberal and populist right-wing MPs used gender-equality arguments, stating that "the burqa is a symbol of submission that does not fit into our value-system" (jVVD, 1073) or "the worst kind of women-unfriendly clothing" (Groep Eerdmans, TK 15, October 19, 2006 , 1074 . They claimed that women donning face covers excluded themselves from mainstream society and the labor market, because face-veils hinder face-to-face communication and social interaction (TK 15, October 19, 2006 , 1073 In August 2006, the Minister for Alien Affairs and Integration, Rita Verdonk (VVD), appointed a commission of experts to examine the legal options available for prohibiting wearing the burqa and other face coverings in public space (Moors 2009 ). This committee argued that a full ban on burqas infringed upon the non-discrimination principle and the rights to freedom of religion and freedom of choice that liberal democracies should foster (Vermeulen et al. 2006) . The State Council expressed a similar view (No. 03.07.0219/ II, September 2, 2007). Yet, despite these objections a majority in Parliament expressed its support for a ban on face covering in public in April 2008 (TK 31331, no. 2-3, January 24, 2008) .
Unlike the French case, Muslim women's dress did not generate any major debate among feminists. Some controversy arose in 2001, when Cisca Dresselhuys, the editor-in-chief of feminist magazine Opzij, publicly declared she would not hire a journalist wearing a headscarf because it would tap into oppressive religious doctrine. 13 Yet, in 2003 she opposed the French ban, stating it would isolate Muslim girls and women in need of emancipation. Feminist journal Opzij changed its position in 2008, when a new editor-in-chief appointed a veiled columnist. Even with regard to the face-veil, which was more disputed, 14 Dutch feminists never mobilized for a ban. Veiled Muslim women gained little access to the public and political debates. Recently, there have been some mobilizations of veiled (young) women contesting the opposition between the headscarf and emancipation. 15 While some women in Parliament and legal bodies such as the Commission Vermeulen defended the individual right to cover and to participate without discrimination, veiled women had little influence on actual policy decisions.
So far, however, no full burqa ban has come into effect. Also still pending is a government proposal of February 2012 to prohibit all kinds of face covers in public and other public institutions such as schools or public transportation, except in houses of worship and airports. While the regulation on veiling in the Netherlands has thus remained largely accommodative, there has been a clear discursive shift in how veiling is framed within the political realm in which gendering has become a strategy to argue against Muslim veiling and to mark differences between an emancipated "us" and a backward "them" (see also Sauer 2009, 89 ).
Debates about Honor-Related Violence
In the literature and public debate, the term honor-related violence has been widely adopted to describe a range of different forms of violence against women said to be rooted in community perceptions of honor. 16 While migrant women's organizations had been asking attention for this issue for some time, most European governments have been slow to take up this issue (Dustin and Phillips 2008) . As figure 4 indicates, the issue is almost absent from the French political agenda, but became a highly salient issue in the Netherlands in 2004.
In both countries, the issue of honor-related violence is put on the political agenda by right-wing parties, but gets support of left-wing parties as well. In the Netherlands, two conservative Liberal (VVD) MPs, first Geert Wilders and later Ayaan Hirsi Ali, politicized the issue. Yet, the Labour Party (PvdA) supported Hirsi Ali's petition to turn honor-related violence into a priority policy project, which is illustrative of the changed party position after the rise of anti-immigrant parties. The Labour Party increasingly defended a tougher stance on integration issues to "protect" minority women and to draw boundaries to "tolerance" to protect some core Dutch values and norms. A focus on gender inequalities has enabled a respectable shift away from multiculturalism for left-wing parties (Siim and Skeje 2008) . In France, the UMP played a central role in the recent politicization of the issue of violence in minority communities. The mobilizations of the aforementioned NPNS and their culturalist framing of the problem, linking gender oppression to the rise of Islamic radicalism in the French banlieues, well fitted the UMP government's larger security agenda and had a broad resonance in French Parliament. Yet, remarkably, NPNS gained much more voice and standing in the headscarf In Defence of Gender Equality? debate and was less successful in politicizing the issue of violence, which only figured as an additional argument to illustrate that Muslim girls were in need of state protection.
France
Until 2000, discussions of violence against women were remarkably absent from the French public and political agenda. Women's organizations that tried to draw attention to the issue had gained little public visibility (Ticktin 2008 ). Yet, in 2000 there was a sudden media boom on the issue of "gang rapes" (les tournantes) in the migrant-populated suburbs ("banlieues") of Paris. A film called La Squale (2000) first told the story of such collective rapes by boys of North African descent. Another tragic incident that sparked attention was the brutal murder of a girl of Moroccan descent in October 2002. This incident inspired a group of young women of migrant origin to start the before mentioned NPNS. The group organized a march on March 8, 2003 that attracted about 30,000 participants, among them anti-racist and feminist organizations, but also politicians from almost all major political parties. The message of NPNS women, that sexist and violent practices targeting women in the banlieues should be countered by the principle of laïcité, made the organization appealing to the French state and a great ally in the defence of Republican values. This resonance was especially clear when NPNS's message was incorporated in the celebration of Bastille Day in 2003. Photographs of NPNS members dressed as La Marianne, the feminine symbol of the French Republic, were exhibited on the front columns of the French National Assembly.
The NPNS thus rapidly gained political support, but not so much for their original goal of improving the living situations of women in the banlieues and fighting violence against women. Instead, the group became mainly instrumental in the political controversy about the veil, as discussed before. The NPNS slogan "Ni voile, ni viol" (Neither veil nor rape) that hinted at cultural or religious explanations for violence was particularly visible as an argument in favor of the veil ban.
From 2003 onwards, some minor political actions to develop policies to combat violence against ethnic minority women were taken, most of them firmly anchored in the project of affirming French Republican values (Ticktin 2008) . In 2003, the newly established anti-discrimination body "Le Haut Conseil a l'intégration" (2003) published a non-binding advice to the prime minister, in which it encouraged the government to pay more attention to the integration of migrant women, situating issues such as polygamy, forced marriages, parental authority and female circumcision as problems imported by migrants' foreign culture. In 2005, the government launched a national plan to fight violence against women in which some attention was paid to violence within migrant communities, in particular forced marriages. 17 That same year, a new parliamentary working group on women's rights, headed by Marie-Jo Zimmerman of the right-wing UMP, issued a report on the position of migrant women in France that also paid some attention to gender-based violence (Assamblée Nationale 2005). Referring to the writings of Dutch MP Ayaan Hirsi Ali, it explained that the curtailment of immigrant women's freedoms and sexuality are related to particular gender relations and roles within (Islamic) migrant cultures that force minority women to protect the family or community's honor by adhering to certain religious and cultural community norms such as virginity (p. 23). The commission observed a growing "intégrism" (religious fundamentalism) and a tendency among migrants to isolate themselves (p. 29). Even though the report hinted at the persistent marginalization and socio-economic discrimination of migrant minorities in France as underlying problems (p. 7), the proposed solution was not a revision of the Republican project of integration but rather its revitalization. The commission argued that reinforcing the national identity and enlightenment values through the Republican school would be the best solution to tackling the problem of gender-based violence in the banlieues (p. 40, 65) . This policy framing enabled the promotion of state policies that emphasized migrants' assimilation to Republican values, notably gender equality. Although the report paid some attention to the issue of honor-related violence, it was not articulated as a policy problem, nor were any specific measures taken to combat violence against ethnic minority women. While NPNS managed to attract a lot of political attention for the situation of (Muslim) migrant women and girls and got access to the political realm, their political success in influencing actual policy decisions has remained very limited. Most of the solutions that NPNS recommended, 18 such as support networks and shelter services for victims, awareness campaigns in schools and special services within the quartiers' police stations, were not adopted (Amara 2003, 116) . NPNS, along with other associations like the Collectif National Pour Les Droits des Femmes (CNPDF), campaigned for legislation against sexual and domestic violence that Segolene Royal adopted in her presidential campaign of 2007, but that was shelved after her defeat (Fayard and Rocheron 2009, 7) . In 2010, after continuing feminist lobbying and pressure, Prime Minister Franc¸ois Fillon set up a parliamentary commission on violence against women that discussed the proposal for a loi cadre and made 2010 the year when the issue of violence against women would be a "grande cause nationale". That same year, Parliament adopted the "Loi du 9 juillet 2010 relative aux violences faites spécifiquement aux femmes, aux violences au sein des couples et aux incidences de ces dernières sur les enfants". The new legislation also focuses on forced marriage, authorizes the electronic tagging of violent partners, and provides help to alleged victims well before their case goes to court. Yet, the law is merely focused on conjugal violence and does not protect women against other forms of violence (Fayard and Rocheron 2009 ).
The Netherlands
In the Netherlands, the issue of honor-related violence was originally put on the public agenda by Kezban, an organization founded by ethnic minority women after the murder of Kezban Vural in 1999. The group labelled Kezban's murder as an honor killing. Also, they argued that violence against minority women was being overlooked and that Kezban had not received the police protection she had asked for. Their public cry received no attention in national politics. Yet, from 2000 onwards, some MPs, both right-and leftwing, started to call political attention to the issue of gender-based violence in ethnic minority communities. They referred to practices of honor-based violence, female genital mutilation, or forced marriages and labelled these as either "harmful traditional practices" or "cultural practices" to distinguish them from "regular" domestic violence. In these debates, patriarchal violence was turned into an essential property of minority cultures, passed on to future generations, and a threat to the Dutch value of gender equality. Key political actors in this politicization were Geert Wilders and Ayaan Hirsi Ali, at that time both MPs of the Liberal Party (VVD).
In 2003 and 2004, several incidences that were labelled honor violence in the media attracted political attention. In September 2003, MPs Lambregts (D'66), Hirsi Ali (VVD), and Eerdmans (LPF) asked the government to take measures as to prevent future acts of "honor violence". MP Eerdmans (LPF) stated that "honor violence apparently still is part and parcel of some ethnic minority groups' cultural habits, which is morally unacceptable and does not fit Dutch norms and values" and argued that this kind of violence should be more severely punished than other forms of violence. 19 While most MPs that participated in the debate situated this problem within the Dutch-Turkish community, MP Albayrak of the Labour Party, herself of Turkish origin, pointed out that she perceived similar patterns in other minority groups, in particular within the Surinamese "Hindu" community (TK 7-256, September 30, 2003) . A few weeks later, honor-related violence became a central issue in the deliberations about the 2004 Budget for Integration (TK 58, March 16, 2004, 58-3840) . In the debate, MP Nawijn (LPF) and MP Hirsi Ali (VVD) started a discussion about Dutch culture and identity. Hirsi Ali pointed out that Dutch integration policies had failed to assimilate ethnic minorities to central Dutch values such as individual freedom, gender equality, nondiscrimination, the separation of church and state, and freedom of expression. One proof of this failed integration, she argued, was the high incidence of "cultural forms" of violence among ethnic minorities. Hirsi Ali pointed to the socialization of Dutch norms and values, through education, as an important means to end these practices. This civilization mission, she argued, might also reach beyond the Dutch borders: "in the longer term non-western migrants can export our liberal values to their countries of origin." A few months later, Hirsi Ali petitioned the government to take actions against honor-related violence. She stated that "when ethnic minority women and girls start to make their own independent and emancipated choices, they are often confronted with (the threat of) violence by their family and peers" and that "as long as these women are threatened they will not succeed to integrate and emancipate" (TK 29203, nr. 5) .
In April 2005, Hirsi Ali together with the MP Nebahat Albayrak (PvdA) requested the government to turn the issue of honor-based violence into a priority project. 20 All parties in Parliament, with the exception of the ruling Christian Democratic Party, supported the petition (HTK, 30 388, nr. 6) . Hirsi Ali framed the problem as an expression of traditional and womenunfriendly values in Islam honour killing is a component of something bigger. It has to do with sexual morality within Islam, the desire to control women's sexuality. A woman who does not abide by the rules is allowed to be expelled, hit, murdered (TK 28345, 29203, nr. 40: 1 ).
Yet, most parties, with the exception of the Freedom Party (PVV), distanced themselves from this explicit link to Islam as an underlying cause, although a majority agreed in their framing of honor-based violence as an ethnic or cultural issue present in some specific ethnic communities, drawing a clear line between "regular" domestic violence and honor-based violence. MP Henk In Defence of Gender Equality?
Kamp of the Liberal Conservative party (VVD) claimed: "honour killing is an excess of other cultures and will not be accepted under any condition in the Netherlands" (TK 2007 (TK -2008 .
In response, the government developed a priority project to combat honor-related violence (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) . The programme's special status, priority, and large budget not only suggested that honor-related violence is very different from "normal" domestic violence, but also that it is a much bigger and more urgent problem, adding to the feeling of "threat" associated with minorities. The programme targeted Turkish, Moroccan, and refugee organizations, as central "problem owners" (Brenninkmeijer, Geerse, and Roggeband 2009) and involved them in the sensitization of the problem within their communities, as well as in the training of service providers. Yet, minority organizations criticized the strong culturalization of the problem that according to them added to the stigmatization of the minority population. They opposed the mobilization of the issue by right-wing politicians to represent minority groups as inherently violent or oppressive. Organizations that had struggled to get the issue of violence against minority women on the agenda, including foundation Kezban, were unhappy about the sharp distinctions drawn between violence in ethnic minority groups and "non-cultural" domestic violence, 21 which they saw as obstructing coalition building with other organizations addressing the issue of violence against women. Also, they argued that the hypervisibility of the problem had made it difficult to name and confront violent practices within their communities without being accused of buying into the culturalist and stigmatizing dominant discourse.
Comparison
When comparing the debates on the veil and honor-related violence in France and the Netherlands, we see some differences in the timing and level of politicization of both issues and the policy solutions that are proposed. While France prohibits religious dress in public schools and the public sector and recently passed a ban on face-veils in public space, the Netherlands largely tolerates the display of religious dress and symbols in public institutions. The issue of honor-related violence became a major issue on the Dutch political agenda in 2006, but received only scant attention in the French political debate. France has addressed the issue within larger gender-equality agendas, which contrasts with the Dutch policy approach that focuses on honor-related violence as a particular form of violence that stems from culturally specific gender relations within communities of immigrant origin (Roggeband and Verloo 2007; Korteweg and Yurdakul 2010) . The different policy outcomes reflect institutionalized histories of interpreting and governing ethnic, religious (when the issue is framed in religious terms) and gender differences, which together shaped the political debates in intersecting ways (Ferree 2009, 86) .
The headscarf was hard to reconcile with the French notion of universal citizenship and the principle of laïcité. The laïcité concept played a central role in the political debates, although its meaning was contested (Scott 2007) . Many politicians presented laïcité as a tool to promote social and national cohesion by integrating citizens into a public realm where they were to share the same universal values of equality, freedom, and solidarity (Bowen 2007; Scott 2007) . In contrast, in the Dutch debates in the 1980s and 1990s, policy actors made reference to the principle of secularism to protect the freedom of religious minorities from the liberal state. The Dutch national tradition of establishing institutions for the recognition of cultural, ethnic, and religious difference and regulating state-church relations explains the accommodative stance towards headscarves that prevailed during the 1990s. Yet, after the turn of the century onwards, Islamic head and body covering became a controversial subject and the Dutch debate started to converge with the French debate. In both countries, veiling was increasingly framed as "women-unfriendly", a threat to national identity and as a sign of religious fundamentalism.
While existing state-church traditions played a major role in the framing of head and body covering, the issue of religion was virtually absent in the debates in honor-related violence, despite the attempts of Ayaan Hirsi Ali in the Netherlands to frame honor-related violence as a problem originating in Islam. Instead, traditions of dealing with ethnic and gender differences provide some explanation as to why honor-related violence became a major political issue in the Netherlands and remained marginal-despite some feminist attempts-in France. The French universal citizenship model prevents the recognition of group differences, impeding claims of recognition by ethnic and religious minorities or women as a distinct status group. This made it particularly difficult for French feminists to get the issue of violence against women on the political agenda, let alone the issue of violence against migrant or ethnic minority women (Mazur 2007, 120) . Instead, the issue was much easier to politicize in the Netherlands, where a strong tradition in gender-equality policies already had placed the issue of violence against women on the political agenda since the late 1970s. Moreover, the framing of honor-related violence as a particular kind of violence originating in the culture of migrants, "fitted" the Dutch policy legacy that institutionalizes and naturalizes ethnic differences and targeted ethnic minorities as a specific policy category. Policy legacies thus interact differently in each debate, resulting in country-specific approaches to each issue.
Yet, our empirical data also make clear that, after initial differences in policy responses towards the veil and honor-related violence in both countries, framing of these issues started to converge after the turn of the millennium and in both France and the Netherlands, actors struggled to (re)define the nation, secularism, and (gendered and racialized) modes of citizenship and so challenge hegemonic discourses and dominant institutional models and traditions. In particular in both countries, politicians started to promote cultural assimilation as a precondition for integration and citizenship. In the Netherlands, new right-wing parties contested the dominant idea that the state has no right to interfere with the religion of its subjects and argued that a neutral state implied In Defence of Gender Equality? that public functionaries should not display any religious symbols. In France, the Stasi Commission took departure from the earlier accommodative French policy and presented the principle of laïcité as grounds for setting limits to citizens' expression of "difference", and even to cultural and religious identification (Thomas 2006, 241) . This dynamic framing contest resulted in policy responses that changed over time. The analysis of the debates also shows changes in framing positions of the actors involved in the debate. Shifts in power configurations created (new) discourse coalitions between politicians and affected the salience of the issues in the political realm. In France, the peaks in politicization of the veil coincide with electoral gains of the extreme right Front Nationale (FN). 22 As Ezekiel argues, since the mid-1980s, the FN discourse has spread far beyond the limits of that party, to the center right, but also into the Left. The Socialist party, including members of the government, began speaking of the "problem" of immigration and "thresholds of tolerance" (Ezekiel 2006, 262) . Since the turn of the century, the French integration "model" has changed, and issues like ethnic monitoring, affirmative action, and minority representation are no longer taboo subjects in French official discourse and actions (Bleich 2008) . In the Netherlands, new right-wing political players like Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders made their appearance on the Dutch scene only after the turn of the century, but as in the case of France their anti-immigrant discourse had a strong impact on the discourses of other parties as we have seen. 23 The rise of new radical right parties also created competition between right-wing parties who lost voters to these new emerging parties. In the Netherlands, VVD started profiling itself as an anti-immigration party committed to uniculturalism and nationalist forms of citizenship and Ayaan Hirsi Ali has played an important role in the VVD's competition with the LPF (Akkerman and Hagelund 2007) .
In both countries, right-wing and anti-immigrant parties helped to build and then capitalized on a new selective gender-equality agenda (Akkerman and Hagelund 2007) in which gender-equality arguments, together with other liberal values, were employed to demonstrate the incompatibility of migrant culture and religion with majority culture. The hijab/burqa and honor-related violence were strategically framed as problems that demonstrate these incompatibilities, enabling more restrictive demands upon immigrants and Muslim minorities that simultaneously deny women's agency and feminist value of autonomy. In this discourse, the state should protect women and girls against abuse and violence that mark immigrant communities.
The politicization of these issues by right-wing actors created new discourse coalitions with left-wing parliamentary representatives and women's organizations that-with some success-had earlier tried to draw attention to the precarious position of immigrant women (Roggeband 2010) . For instance, in the Netherlands Ayaan Hirsi Ali's agenda for the emancipation of Islamic women opened some space for an alliance between the VVD and the left (Akkerman and Hagelund 2007) , as became visible in the debate on honor-related violence where PvdA and VVD together requested that the government turn the topic into a priority policy problem. In France, the Parti Socialiste changed its position in the headscarf debate to launch a law proposal to ban religious symbolism in public schools that earlier had been promoted by RPR/UMF.
Right-wing politicians also sought the support of-preferably ethnic minority-feminist activists and women's organizations. In France, Raffarin symbolically invited NPNS on International Women's Day 2003. Also, the Stasi Commission summoned NPNS and other mainly secular migrant women that stressed that non-veiled women in French suburbs were in need of protection from Islamic fundamentalists. In the Netherlands, both Hirsi Ali and Minister of Justice Verdonk actively sought the support of migrant women's organizations for their claims and tried to assign to migrant women's organizations a central role in the execution of governmental policies directed at migrant women (Roggeband 2010 ). Yet, the selective inclusion of feminists and ethnic minority women was largely symbolic, and their arguments were only partly adopted. While NPNS initially managed to draw attention to the issue of violence against women in the banlieues, which they related to Islamic macho culture and patterns of Islamization, their arguments were mainly instrumentalized to press for a headscarf ban. Through their framing that linked violence to Muslim migrants' culture, they managed to link the issue to the larger security agenda of the UMP government in the French banlieues, which were framed as the "lost territories of the Republic". But the right-wing government paid only lip service to other demands, like the need for shelters or structural policies to tackle poverty and discrimination that intersect with patterns of gender inequality. In the Netherlands, the efforts of politicians to involve migrant women's organizations in carrying out its policy agenda to combat honor-related violence were less successful, since most organizations criticized the culturalization of the problem.
Conclusions and Discussion
Our analysis shows that despite the different institutional legacies in France and the Netherlands, debates on the headscarf and honor-related violence have increasingly converged, notably in the use of gender-equality arguments to (re)draw the borders of the nation state. In the dominant frames regarding the headscarf and honor-related violence, migrant cultures are represented as a threat to national values-among which gender-equality-and the coherence of the nation state. The surveillance and rescuing of the female body serves to legitimate certain policy interventions, such as the banning of Islamic veils in public space or the disciplining of Muslim men, and helps to redraw public/private boundaries (Razack 2004; Rottmann and Ferree 2008; Bilge 2010) . In France, politicians argue that public sphere is to remain culture-free, neutral, universal, and in the Netherlands right-wing politicians argue that the Dutch do not want to be confronted with symbols they perceive as women-unfriendly. The private In Defence of Gender Equality?
sphere of ethnic minorities is increasingly scrutinized, questioned, and interpreted. Our analysis illustrates that this gendering of the nation works differently and unevenly across countries, and even within countries for different issues. Country-specific institutionalized policy legacies not only shape the particular gendering of policy discourses, actors themselves also help to sustain or change hegemonic state projects by invoking different elements of their institutional environment in their framing of the issue.
While gender-equality arguments figure centrally in the political debates on the headscarf and honor-related violence, the arguments of (ethnic minority) women's organizations are selectively included and bent to serve other, non-feminist agendas. Ethnic minority women's organizations and female ethnic minority politicians have acted as agenda-setters, asking attention for their marginalized position, discrimination against them and experiences of violence, yet these issues were co-opted by right-wing politicians to problematize the "deviant" culture of minorities and propose policies that further exclude them and paternalize them instead of improving their situation. As a result, even if women's organizations manage to gender political debates, they are not always successful in steering the direction of the debate and their agendas are only very partially adopted. Moreover, within the political game, figures such as Ayaan Hirsi Ali and NPNS activists are symbolically included as speakers for minority women and knowers of Islam. They are represented as models of "integration" and-in the French case-a paradigmatic republican citizen who has cast aside her particular identity to embody the abstract universalism of republican citizenship. Yet, at the same time they are demarcated as different immigrants or immigrant daughters giving them an outsider status that they can never overcome, regardless of their level of assimilation. Ethnic and religious minorities have to deal with what Dhamoon (2013) calls a "dual tactics of regulated inclusion and exclusion" in which they may be formally included in as "equal citizens", while at the same time excluded discursively and culturally. Intersecting gendered, ethnic, cultural, and religious norms determine the in-and outsider status of minority groups (Dhamoon 2013) . As our cases show, we need to look at the interaction between institutional settings, actors and framing to understand how and when these terms of inclusion and exclusion are negotiated and become subject to change. Notes 1. We use Connell's (2002) definition that feminism is about steering the gender order in directions that are empowering for women.
2. Maria Stratigaki (2004) explains: "The meanings of key concepts initially introduced by feminists and originally grounded in feminist ideas [may be] conceptually transformed . . . resulting in the loss of their potential for changing gender relations" (p. 31). Co-optation occurs when "the concept itself is not
